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COMMENTS 
EXXON SHIPPING CO. V. BAKER: THE PERILS OF JUDICIAL 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES REFORM 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker 
established a conservative one-to-one cap on the ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages in maritime law.  This decision raises the question 
whether the Court will apply a similar constitutional limit in future punitive 
damages cases.  In the meantime, lower courts have already begun to rely on 
Exxon Shipping as persuasive authority for limiting punitive damages further 
than the Supreme Court’s previous cases require.  This Comment argues that 
Exxon Shipping’s one-to-one cap in maritime cases is inconsistent with key 
principles of punitive damages law, advises against the application of Exxon 
Shipping’s one-to-one cap in non-maritime cases, and explains why the 
Supreme Court should not enact a similar cap on punitive damages in future 
constitutional cases. 
Punitive damages are too important to be capped at a one-to-one ratio with 
compensatory damages.  This Comment explains that such a cap has the 
potential to create significant economic inefficiencies.  Moreover, a one-to-one 
cap undermines the retributive role of punitive damages since reprehensible 
conduct often may not result in substantial compensatory damages.  The rule 
of Exxon Shipping will likely remain the law in admiralty, but, as this 
Comment argues, courts should not to expand the rule of Exxon Shipping 
beyond maritime cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the U.S. Supreme Court held that punitive 
damages for reckless conduct should be limited to a one-to-one ratio with 
compensatory damages as a matter of maritime common law.1  Exxon Shipping 
represents a departure from the Court’s prior punitive damages cases such as 
 
 1 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633 (2008). 
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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell2 and BMW of North 
America, Inc. v. Gore,3 where the Court evaluated punitive damages awards 
under the Due Process Clause.4  In some respects, Exxon Shipping is an 
extension of these earlier cases because while the Court ostensibly based its 
holding on maritime law, it did not rely on maritime law precedent.5  Rather, 
the Court based its decision upon fairness considerations, policy analysis, and 
statistical studies of punitive damages.  This Comment argues that the Court’s 
reasoning fails to justify its strict limitation of maritime punitive damages.  
Building upon and revising some of the conclusions of earlier scholarship, this 
Comment demonstrates that punitive damages often need to exceed a one-to-
one ratio with compensatory damages to deter future harms and provide 
retributive justice.6  Finally, just as the Court criticizes “outlier” punitive 
damages awards,7 this Comment argues that Exxon Shipping itself should be 
viewed as an “outlier” case and should not be treated as persuasive authority 
for placing further limits on non-maritime punitive damages. 
This Comment focuses on the potentially far-reaching implications of 
Exxon Shipping’s one-to-one cap on punitive damages for reckless conduct.  
Although punitive damages are a controversial feature of American law,8 this 
Comment shows that punitive damages are too important to be rendered 
ineffectual by overly stringent caps.  By increasing liability to an amount in 
excess of what is required to compensate the plaintiff, a punitive award goes 
beyond the traditional goal of making the plaintiff whole.9  Important 
deterrence and retributive rationales justify this extra-compensatory penalty.10  
 
 2 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 3 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 4 Id. at 562 (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a 
‘grossly excessive’ punishment on a tortfeasor.” (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 
443, 454 (1993))). 
 5 See Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2619–34. 
 6 See Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and 
Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 910 (2008) (“Deterrence is the function of tort law by which the law 
creates incentives that induce people to avoid inappropriately dangerous activities.”). 
 7 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2633 (“[T]he unpredictable outlier cases . . . call the fairness of the 
system into question.”). 
 8 Alex Sienkiewicz, Towards a Legal Land Ethic: Punitive Damages, Natural Value, and the Ecological 
Commons, 15 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 99 (2006). 
 9 See Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 10 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2621 (“Regardless of the alternative rationales over the years, the 
consensus today is that punitives are aimed . . . at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”); Marc Galanter 
& David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1428 (1993). 
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Although these rationales occasionally conflict,11 this Comment argues that 
they frequently overlap—especially when the defendant’s conduct is reckless.  
This analysis reveals that the Court’s adoption of a one-to-one cap in cases of 
reckless conduct lacks support.  To be useful, punitive damages often must be 
awarded at a higher ratio.12 
Part I of this Comment examines facts of the Exxon Valdez oil spill that 
were glossed over in the mainstream media and demonstrates why, from a 
retributivist perspective, the Exxon corporation may have deserved 
punishment.  Part II demonstrates that punitive damages are a vital part of the 
common law, many states have already limited punitive damages, and the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence on punitive damages adequately 
protects defendants from egregious punitive awards.  The heart of this 
Comment, Part III, presents an economic analysis of various situations in 
which punitive damages should be awarded at a greater than one-to-one ratio, 
explains the retributivist approach to punitive damages, and illustrates how the 
two can be reconciled.  Part IV critiques the Court’s reasoning in Exxon 
Shipping, emphasizing its failure to take account of the role of punitive 
damages in providing deterrence and retribution.  Finally, Part V argues that 
Exxon Shipping should not be viewed as persuasive authority for limiting 
punitive damages in non-maritime cases. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Although the Valdez oil spill was one of the most publicized anthropogenic 
environmental disasters in history,13 many of the facts surrounding the incident 
were deliberately obscured by Exxon’s public relations experts and are not 
well-known.14  These facts reveal that the spill was the result of Exxon’s 
foolish decision to allow a captain who was a “relapsed alcoholic” to pilot the 
 
 11 Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 
99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 577 (2005) (“[T]he goals of deterrence . . . may well conflict with those of 
retribution . . . .”). 
 12 Galanter & Luban, supra note 10, at 1396 (“[I]f punitive damages are pared back too drastically, civil 
law may be underenforced.”). 
 13 JAMES W. DEARING & EVERETT M. ROGERS, AGENDA-SETTING 39 (1996) (noting the “massive media 
attention given to the Exxon Valdez incident”); Hannah Lendon & Brian Martin, Environmental Disasters, in 
BRIAN MARTIN ET AL., JUSTICE IGNITED 99, 103 (2006) (“Of all spills, the Exxon Valdez is most well-
known.”). 
 14 See RIKI OTT, NOT ONE DROP: BETRAYAL AND COURAGE IN THE WAKE OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL 
SPILL 19, 66–67 (2008) (“Exxon launched an aggressive public relations campaign to quiet ‘rumors’ of 
extensive damage from its spill.”). 
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Valdez.15  In addition to the circumstances of the spill itself, Exxon’s promises 
before the spill and its behavior after the spill underscore the justification for 
retributivist damages.16 
In January 1968, America’s largest oil field17 was discovered 250 miles 
north of the Arctic Circle in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska.18  Because the surrounding 
ocean is frozen much of the year at this latitude, several oil companies 
proposed to build the 800-mile Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) to 
transport oil from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez, Alaska, where it would be pumped 
into tankers for marine transport.19  It was clear at an early stage that the 
environmental risks of the project included the possibility of massive oil spills 
that could jeopardize the ecology and economy of Prince William Sound and 
disrupt the subsistence lifestyles of Alaskans and Native Americans living in 
the area.20 
To alleviate fears of an environmental catastrophe, the oil companies 
involved, including Exxon, promised both the public and Congress (whose 
approval was required)21 that they would adhere to high standards of care to 
curtail or even eliminate the risk of major oil spills.22  These promises 
convinced Congress, and in the summer of 1977, the first tanker carrying oil 
from Prudhoe Bay cast off from the Port of Valdez into the waters of Prince 
William Sound.23 
 
 15 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2640 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting) (“The jury could reasonably 
have believed that Exxon knowingly allowed a relapsed alcoholic repeatedly to pilot a vessel filled with 
millions of gallons of oil through waters that provided the livelihood for the many plaintiffs in this case.”); see 
also id. at 2612 (majority opinion) (detailing Captain Hazelwood’s consumption of alcohol). 
 16 CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS 374–75 (1999) (describing the contingency plans that oil 
companies were required to submit before being allowed to operate in Prince William Sound as “fantasy 
documents”). 
 17 OTT, supra note 14, at 273. 
 18 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALASKAN NORTH SLOPE OIL: LIMITING EFFECTS OF LIFTING EXPORT 
BAN ON OIL AND SHIPPING INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMERS 12 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/ 
1999/rc99191.pdf. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Brief of the Alaska Legislative Council et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10, Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/ 
preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-219_RespondentAmCuAlaskaLegCouncil.pdf. 
 21 OTT, supra note 14, at 24. 
 22 Brief of the Alaska Legislative Council et al., supra note 20, at 10; OTT, supra note 14, at 273 (“[In 
1972] oilmen and/or [the] Nixon administration repeatedly promised that state-of-the-art construction, tankers, 
navigational procedures, and oil spill response equipment will make ‘operations in Port Valdez and Prince 
William Sound the safest in the world.’”). 
 23 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 18, at 12. 
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Within two years, the oil companies were beginning to disregard their 
earlier promises to Congress, including the pledge to use double-bottomed 
tankers, which would have limited the impact of a spill by as much as fifty 
percent.24  The companies also fell behind in contingency planning and 
preparedness.  After the Valdez spill, an investigative team found that Exxon’s 
“emergency plan” contained no contingency planning specifically tailored to 
conditions at Prince William Sound.25  Apparently, Exxon’s only on-shore 
response equipment consisted of a van and some sampling gear.26  This lack of 
preparedness ensured that effective cleanup would be nearly impossible in the 
event of a spill.27 
The Valdez spill occurred several minutes after midnight on March 24, 
1989, when the Valdez struck a reef in Prince William Sound, tearing open 
eleven of the ship’s cargo tanks with gashes that extended along its full 
length.28  Shortly afterwards, Coast Guard investigators discovered that the 
ship’s captain, a known alcoholic, had taken command that night after 
consuming five double vodkas.29  Within several weeks of the spill, oil had 
spread to cover one thousand square miles of pristine ocean.30 
Prince William Sound is a highly sensitive marine environment,31 and it is 
especially vulnerable to the long-term effects of an oil spill because cold water 
temperatures in the Sound result in slower-than-usual weathering and 
biodegradation of oil.32  The spilled oil killed marine birds, mammals,33 and 
fish.34  In addition, the spill affected the livelihoods of roughly one-third of 
Alaska’s twelve thousand commercial fishermen,35 and fishery closings caused 
 
 24 OTT, supra note 14, at 2; see also U.S. COAST GUARD, OIL SPILL RESPONSE RESEARCH & 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: A DECADE OF ACHIEVEMENT 37 (2003). 
 25 SAMUEL K. SKINNER & WILLIAM K. REILLY, NAT’L RESPONSE TEAM, THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL: 
A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 8 (1989) [hereinafter NAT’L RESPONSE TEAM REPORT], available at 
www.uscg.mil/History/.../ExxonValdezNRT1989Report.pdf. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Lendon & Martin, supra note 13, at 103.  However, even if Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, 
Exxon, and the Coast Guard had been more prepared, an effective cleanup would have been unlikely.  See 
Eliot Marshall, Valdez: The Predicted Oil Spill, SCIENCE, April 1989, at 20. 
 28 NAT’L RESPONSE TEAM REPORT, supra note 25, at 3. 
 29 In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001).  Exxon officials were aware of the captain’s 
alcohol problems.  ROBERT M. SCHOCH, CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 44 (1996). 
 30 NAT’L RESPONSE TEAM REPORT, supra note 25, at 13. 
 31 Id. at 26–27, 31. 
 32 Id. at 25. 
 33 Id. at 27. 
 34 Id. at 28. 
 35 Id. at 31. 
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by the spill affected an estimated three to four thousand workers in the area’s 
fish processing industry.36  The spill resulted in serious financial losses and 
psychological stresses for the inhabitants of the area, as well as severe and 
long-term damage to the environment.37 
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW: TRADITION AND REFORM 
Turning from the facts of the spill, this Part describes the adequacy and 
reasonableness of punitive damages law and its reforms prior to the Court’s 
decision in Exxon Shipping.  Section A reveals that punitive damages, far from 
being a modern invention, have long been part of the common law38 and have 
served important functions.  Section B shows that state statutes frequently limit 
punitive damages—proving that legislatures are capable of reforming punitive 
damages without intervention by courts.  Although some of these statutes have 
harmful effects,39 they nonetheless provide valuable data on the costs and 
benefits of tort reform.40  Finally, Section C argues that the punitive damages 
cases where the Supreme Court relied on the Due Process Clause place 
reasonable constitutional limits on punitive damages.  Taken together, common 
law principles, statutory limits, and constitutional interpretations show that 
Exxon Shipping’s one-to-one rule is overly restrictive in any context—but 
should certainly not be construed as applying beyond maritime law. 
A. Common Law Punitive Damages 
The first English case to provide an explicit articulation of punitive 
damages was Wilkes v. Wood, decided in 1763.41  In Wilkes, the plaintiff 
argued that “trifling damages would put no stop at all” to the defendant’s 
conduct, and the court agreed.42  Wilkes thus recognized an important 
economic justification for punitive damages: They are sometimes necessary to 
 
 36 Id. 
 37 Brief of Sociologists, Psychologists & Law & Economics Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents passim, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219), available at http:// 
www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-219_RespondentAmCuSocPsychLawEcoScholars.pdf. 
 38 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 5 (5th ed. 2005). 
 39 See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Children, Women, and the Elderly, 
53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1307 (2004) (“[C]aps on punitive damages that tie them to the amount of economic loss 
only can have a disparate impact on injured women.”). 
 40 Mark C. Weber, Mass Jury Trials in Mass Tort Cases: Some Preliminary Issues, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 
463, 473 (1998). 
 41 SCHLUETER, supra note 38, at 5. 
 42 Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (KB). 
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deter the defendant from engaging in similar conduct in the future.43  A later 
English case, Merest v. Harvey, exemplifies a second economic justification 
for punitive damages.44  In Merest, the court remarked that it was appropriate 
to award punitive damages in a case involving a defendant who had 
provocatively knocked off the plaintiff’s hat,45 reasoning that awards in such 
cases served to “prevent the practice of dueling.”46 
Linda Schlueter, author of the treatise Punitive Damages, shows that by the 
mid-eighteenth century, established legal doctrine held that punitive damages 
could be used to punish the defendant in cases of “malice, oppression, or gross 
fraud.”47  Unlike today,48 juries were given “unfettered discretion” to decide 
the amount of damages.49  Schlueter notes that punitive damages were also 
used to compensate for injuries that were not otherwise compensable in 
English law at the time,50 such as “hurt feelings, wounded dignity, or insult.”51  
Across the Atlantic, early American courts also recognized benefits of punitive 
damages.  As Justice Story remarked in Boston Manufacturing Co. v. Fiske, 
courts commonly used punitive damages to penalize “offending parties,” even 
in maritime cases.52  Concurrent with a trend toward allowing compensatory 
damages for emotional suffering, American courts in the nineteenth century 
began to limit the purposes of punitive damages to punishment and 
deterrence.53  In 1851, the Supreme Court explained the extra-compensatory 
role played by punitive damages in Day v. Woodworth: “It is a well established 
principle of the common law that . . . a jury may inflict . . . exemplary, 
punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity 
 
 43 Accord Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[Compensatory 
damages] would be too slight to give the victim an incentive to sue . . . .  [T]o limit the plaintiff to 
compensatory damages would enable the defendant to commit the offensive act with impunity provided he was 
willing to pay . . . .”). 
 44 SCHLUETER, supra note 38, at 9. 
 45 Id. at 10. 
 46 Merest v. Harvey, (1814) 128 Eng. Rep. 761, 761 (Heath, J.). 
 47 SCHLUETER, supra note 38, at 6. 
 48 David Fink, Note, Best v. Taylor Machine Works, The Remittitur Doctrine, and the Implications for 
Tort Reform, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 228 (1999) (“The remittitur doctrine exists in virtually every jurisdiction 
nationwide . . . .”). 
 49 SCHLUETER, supra note 38, at 6.  However, in certain cases a grand jury would review the jury’s 
findings, and if the grand jury overturned these findings, members of the jury would be subject to severe 
penalties.  Id. at 6 n.31. 
 50 Id. at 8. 
 51 Id. 
 52 2 Mason 119, 121 (1820). 
 53 Id. at 16. 
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of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.”54  
Thus, the Supreme Court recognized the common law view of punitive 
damages more than 150 years ago.  This basic view remained settled until the 
era of tort reform in the last decades of the twentieth century.55  In sum, the 
history reveals that punitive damages were approved by the highest courts and 
served vital functions such as discouraging illegal retaliation for provocative 
behavior and deterring defendants from repeating tortious conduct. 
B. Recent Trends in State Regulation of Punitive Damages Law 
In response to a perceived explosion in punitive damages liability in the 
late twentieth century, many states enacted statutes limiting punitive damages 
in various ways.56  Such approaches include (1) limiting punitive damages to 
the amount of compensatory damages (or to some multiple thereof), (2) 
capping punitive damages at specific dollar amounts, (3) prohibiting more than 
one award of punitive damages based on the same conduct, (4) requiring that a 
fixed percentage of all punitive damages awards go to a state victims’ fund, 
and (5) requiring that punitive damages be determined in a proceeding separate 
from one used to determine compensatory damages.57  As Justice Ginsburg 
noted in her dissenting opinion in BMW of North America, Inc., these statutes 
demonstrate that legislatures are capable of limiting punitive damages without 
help from courts.58  In addition, legislative reforms of punitive damages are 
more flexible than common law reforms of the type provided in Exxon 
Shipping because legislation can be repealed or modified without running afoul 
of stare decisis.59 
 
 54 Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851). 
 55 John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort 
Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1021 (2005) (“In the 1970s insurance companies, tobacco interests, 
and large industry launched a political campaign . . . .  Unlike previous reform efforts that sought to change 
rules of law through case-by-case adjudication in the courts, the self-styled tort ‘reform’ movement pursued a 
much grander vision: transforming the cultural understanding of civil litigation . . . by attacking the system 
itself . . . .  [A]dvocates seek to persuade the public through advertising and lobbying that the civil justice 
system is corrupted . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 56 John A. Albers, Note, State of Confusion: Substantive and Procedural Due Process with Regard to 
Punitive Damages After TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 159, 175 (1994) 
(“[S]ince 1986 many states enacted statutes that either placed caps upon the recovery of punitive damages or 
stiffened the burden of proof applicable to such awards.”). 
 57 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 615–19 (1996) (Ginsburg, J. & Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting) (providing comprehensive survey of state legislation affecting punitive damages). 
 58 Id. at 613–14 (“[T]he reexamination prominent in state courts and in legislative arenas . . . serves to 
underscore why the Court’s enterprise is undue.” (footnote omitted)). 
 59 PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT 521 (1969) (“Ordinary legislation, not 
disguised as constitutional interpretation, is flexible and subject to ready change in response to public opinion 
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C. Constitutional Limits on Punitive Damages Awards 
In 1996, the Supreme Court struck down a state court award of punitive 
damages in the landmark case of BMW of North America v. Gore.60  In 2003, 
the Court struck down another state court award in State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, this time clarifying which awards of 
punitive damages violate due process rights.61  In this dramatic episode in the 
history of punitive damages, the Court recognized a constitutional right under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from 
excessive and arbitrary punitive awards.62  This limit applies irrespective of the 
process provided (as with other rights recognized as substantive due process63 
rights).64  These pivotal holdings are summarized in the following paragraphs. 
Although the Supreme Court’s due process cases recognize the value of 
punitive damages awards as both a deterrent and a form of retributive justice,65 
the Court imposed “procedural and substantive constitutional limitations” on 
such awards.66  According to the Court, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment “prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or 
arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”67  Additionally, the Court held that 
compensatory damages should be presumed to make the plaintiff whole, so 
punitive damages should only be awarded in cases where the defendant’s 
conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to warrant further penalties.68  Against 
this presumption, the Court held that, of all the factors to be considered, the 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct was the most relevant in evaluating 
the reasonableness of an award of punitive damages.69 
 
without the tug-of-war which rules of stare decisis generate.  Nor need it overcome the obduracy of men with 
life tenure who, like most men, are not given to confess error.”). 
 60 517 U.S. 559. 
 61 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 62 BMW, 517 U.S. at 568; State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416. 
 63 Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The other objection to 
the due process route in a case such as the present one is that it depends on the idea of ‘substantive’ due 
process.  This is the idea that depriving a person of life, liberty, or property can violate the due process clause 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments even if there are no procedural irregularities . . . .”). 
 64 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 582 (limiting punitive damages despite right to a jury trial and appeals); State 
Farm, 538 U.S. at 416 (limiting punitive damages). 
 65 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 419. 
 69 BMW, 517 U.S. at 575. 
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The Court provided numerical guidelines to indicate when the amount of 
punitive damages in a particular case may be constitutionally excessive.  Few 
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio of punitive to compensatory damages will 
satisfy the requirements of constitutional due process.70  The single-digit ratio 
may be exceeded in cases where the harm is difficult to detect (a view the 
economic literature amply supports)71 or in which an “egregious act has 
resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.”72  Although nine-to-
one is the presumptive ceiling of the ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages, the Court signaled that awards should not cluster at this upper 
bound.73  According to the Court, in many cases a four-to-one ratio “might be 
close to the line of constitutional impropriety,”74 but when compensatory 
damages are “substantial,”75 a one-to-one ratio may be the maximum 
acceptable ratio.76  On the other hand, the Court emphasized that these 
guidelines are not inflexible or absolute,77 and several appellate courts have 
deployed creative arguments to support large punitive awards.78 
Traditional punitive damages and their reform before the decision in Exxon 
Shipping represent a useful and still-evolving body of law under which 
punitive damages have been substantially limited.  The patchwork of state 
statutory limits and the Supreme Court’s overarching constitutional framework 
provide multiple levels of control over potentially erratic awards.  If extended 
to non-maritime cases, Exxon Shipping’s one-to-one cap on punitive damages 
for reckless conduct would override many state statutes and represent a major 
shift away from the flexibility of the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence governing punitive damages. 
 
 70 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. 
 71 E.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 869, 874 (1998). 
 72 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991)). 
 75 Id.  The Court has never defined the amount of compensatory damages that should be considered 
“substantial,” however. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. (“Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate, however, that, in 
practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a 
significant degree, will satisfy due process.”). 
 78 See, e.g., Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont’l Carbon Inc., 481 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding a 
punitive damages award); Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding a 
punitive damages award in excess of nine-to-one ratio). 
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III.  AGAINST ONE-TO-ONE CAPS 
This Part analyzes punitive damages according to both deterrence and 
retributivist rationales.  Section A analyzes the economic and deterrence-based 
reasons for awarding punitive damages.  This argument is limited to the 
context of unintentional torts because focusing on negligence, recklessness, 
and strict liability shows why the Court’s decision in Exxon Shipping is flawed 
from an economic perspective.  Section B presents non-economic and 
retributivist arguments for punitive damages.  Finally, Section C shows how 
economic and retributivist rationales frequently overlap and suggests solutions 
for those cases in which the rationales seem to point in different directions. 
A. Economic & Deterrence-Based Arguments 
Although foreseeable and preventable,79 the Exxon Valdez disaster was an 
accident and not an intentional tort.  Although scholars have written 
extensively about the justifications for punitive damages in the context of 
intentional torts,80 this analysis will focus exclusively on the reasons for 
applying punitive damages in unintentional tort cases.  The first subsection 
introduces four basic economic concepts: (1) the burden of taking precautions, 
(2) the probability of harm, (3) the gravity of harm, and (4) the concept of 
efficient precautions.  The second subsection applies these concepts by 
investigating the incentives faced by a hypothetical firm, “ChemShip,” that 
transports chemicals across the country with a fleet of eighteen-wheeled trucks.  
This example, explored in detail, makes it possible to examine what happens 
when certain variables change, such as the amount of care taken by the 
company and the probability of paying damages, while other variables remain 
constant.  The ChemShip hypothetical demonstrates the need for punitive 
damages in various recurring situations.  For instance, under a strict liability 
regime, punitive damages are warranted when ChemShip will sometimes be 
able to escape paying damages even though its conduct is tortious.81  The third 
subsection uses the ChemShip scenario to demonstrate that in a negligence 
regime the possibility of escaping detection does not necessarily warrant an 
award of punitive damages.  Instead, courts should make the decision to award 
 
 79 See Marshall, supra note 27, at 20. 
 80 See, e.g., DAVID FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT 
MATTERS 206–11 (2001) (discussing economic rationales for applying punitive damages in various intentional 
tort scenarios); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 206–08 (7th ed. 2007) (discussing various 
rationales for punitive damages). 
 81 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 874. 
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punitive damages on a case-by-case basis.82  In both negligence and strict 
liability regimes, a tortfeasor’s attempt to conceal harms or otherwise reduce 
the probability of paying damages justifies an award of punitive damages.  The 
fourth subsection demonstrates that when a tortfeasor’s conduct is reckless, an 
award of punitive damages may be warranted regardless of the probability of 
paying damages.83  Finally, the fifth subsection critiques the argument that 
punitive damages should not be awarded when the defendant is a corporation. 
1. The Hand Formula & Efficient Precautions 
As the common law has long recognized, punitive damages help to punish 
wrongdoers, deter future harms, and avoid other social ills.84  Economic theory 
reveals that punitive damages are particularly important if a tortfeasor has a 
chance of escaping judgment or behaves recklessly.85  The law and economics 
movement shows that harmful accidents can be avoided through changes in the 
degree of caution with which activities are performed and through changes in 
the overall volume of risky activities.86  Liability regimes, such as tort law, 
force potential tortfeasors to take account of the accident costs they impose on 
others.87  Ideally, those engaged in risky activities will take efficient 
precautions by increasing care levels (and sometimes by decreasing activity 
 
 82 This is a departure from Judge Posner’s theory, which holds that punitive damages would be 
inefficient in both negligence and strict liability cases.  POSNER, supra note 80, at 206.  Additionally my 
argument that the analysis of punitive damages differs when the legal standard is negligence sets it apart from 
Polinsky and Shavell’s study.  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 886 (“Because damages should equal 
harm under the strict liability rule, and because we assume that damages should equal harm under the 
negligence rule for the reasons given, we generally will not distinguish between the rules in our subsequent 
discussion.”). 
 83 This conclusion is in partial agreement with existing literature but is based on different reasoning.  See 
POSNER, supra note 80, at 207. 
 84 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989) (“[P]unitive 
damages advance the interests of punishment and deterrence . . . .”); see Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 
347 F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[O]ne function of punitive-damages awards is to relieve the pressures 
on an overloaded system of criminal justice by providing a civil alternative to criminal prosecution of minor 
crimes. . . .  [An] award of punitive damages . . . serves the additional purpose of limiting the defendant’s 
ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection . . . .”). 
 85 See POSNER, supra note 80, at 206–07. 
 86 Shepherd, supra note 6, at 911. 
 87 Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285, 314 (2008) (“Tort 
law is commonly thought of as a mechanism of assigning liability to wrongdoers and thereby forcing them to 
internalize the costs they impose on others.  This, indeed, is its primary effect.”). 
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levels) as long as the anticipated benefit from these additional precautions is 
not outweighed by their cost.88 
Judge Learned Hand’s negligence formula sums up this economic wisdom 
with three simple variables: B for the burden of taking precautions, P for the 
probability of harm, and L for the gravity of harm.89  The formula has proven 
extremely useful in the economic analysis of law, and courts occasionally 
apply it.90  It is important to note how the variables of the Hand Formula 
interact with each other.  Increasing B results in a decrease in P because an 
accident is less likely to occur when precautions are taken.91  In addition, the 
Hand Formula shows how the prospect of liability should encourage rational 
actors to increase care levels to the optimal amount.92  When potential 
tortfeasors take optimal precautions, they minimize costs to society—
calculated as the sum of the risk (P x L)—and the amount of resources devoted 
to precautions (B), or (P x L) + B.93 
2. Punitive Damages & Strict Liability 
This Comment applies the concepts of burden, probability, and gravity of 
harm in a simple example that will demonstrate why a tortfeasor’s liability 
must sometimes exceed the amount of harm that the tortfeasor causes—in 
other words, when a punitive award must be added to compensatory damages.  
For this example, assume that a company, “ChemShip,” owns and operates a 
fleet of eighteen-wheeled trucks that transport chemicals across the United 
States.  Assume that if ChemShip spends no money on precautionary measures 
such as thicker tanks, safety valves, and driver rest requirements, then the 
 
 88 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1096 (2000) (“Traditional law and economics 
suggests that precaution is efficient when its benefits outweigh its costs . . . .”). 
 89 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[I]n algebraic terms: if 
the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L 
multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is less than] PL.”). 
 90 See POSNER, supra note 80, at 168 n.1. 
 91 Michelle J. White, The Economics of Accidents, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (1988) (reviewing 
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987)) (“Economists assume that accidents occur 
less often and involve less damage when potential injurers and victims use higher levels of care.”). 
 92 Cf. Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1096–97 
(1993) (“Standard economic analysis has shown that in the unilateral risk context, strict liability rules can be 
used to induce both efficient caretaking and efficient activity levels, because strict liability can be employed to 
force injurers to bear the full social cost of any risks they create.”). 
 93 Id. at 1096 (describing the “level at which the total social cost of accidents is minimized—that is, the 
level that minimizes the cost of reducing (or eliminating) the risk in question, plus the expected cost to the 
members of society of the resulting injuries”). 
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probability that a hazardous chemical spill will occur over the course of a year 
is 0.05.  If a spill occurs, the resulting harm will be $1 million.  Also assume 
that safety measures are available and not prohibitively expensive.  According 
to a model (which utilizes an equation to relate the money that ChemShip 
might spend on precautions to the probability of a spill),94 an investment of 
$10,000 will decrease the yearly probability of a spill to 0.0153, an investment 
of $20,000 will reduce the probability to 0.0093, and an investment of $30,000 
will reduce the probability to 0.0069.  Note that the incremental reduction in 
the probability of harm decreases with each additional $10,000 spent.95  This 
occurs because reducing risk with additional safety measures becomes 
progressively more expensive.96  Additionally, the equation presupposes that as 
long as ChemShip is engaged in shipping activities, there will always be at 
least a 0.001 probability of a spill in any given year, no matter how much is 
spent on precautions.97  Although the numbers presented in this example are 
hypothetical, they are representative of the situations that the tort doctrines 
relating to accidents seek to control—situations involving risky activities 
where precautions can be taken to reduce risk, but at an increasing marginal 
cost.98  The following graph illustrates this scenario:  
 
 94 The model used here is not intended to reflect the real-world probability of accidents in the chemical 
transportation industry, nor does it realistically depict the amount of money spent on precautionary measures.  
The model does, however, accurately illustrate the relationship between the amount spent on safety 
precautions and the probability of a harmful accident occurring. 
 95 The first $10,000 spent will decrease the probability by 0.0357.  The second $10,000 spent will 
decrease the probability by 0.0060.  And the third $10,000 spent will decrease the probability by 0.0025. 
 96 POSNER, supra note 80, at 168 (“[I]nputs of care are scarce and therefore their price rises as more and 
more are bought.”).  Consequently, the amount of care per dollar decreases as more “care” is purchased. 
 97 This relationship is captured in a function that takes as its argument the dollar amount spent on 
precautions and whose output is the probability of harm.  The equation used for this example is f(x) = 200 / (x 
+ 4000) + 0.001.  It was designed to have a y-intercept of ~ 0.05, a slope that is initially negative but that 
approaches 0, and a value for y that approaches 0.001 as x approaches infinity. 
 98 POSNER, supra note 80, at 168. 
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(P x L) 
Total Cost 
B + (P x L) 
  $0.00 0.0510 $1,000,000.00 $51,000.00   $51,000.00 
*$10,000.00 0.0153 $1,000,000.00 $15,285.71 *$25,285.71 
  $20,000.00 0.0093 $1,000,000.00 $9,333.33   $29,333.33 
  $30,000.00 0.0069 $1,000,000.00 $6,882.35   $36,882.35 
*Represents the socially optimal investment in precautions 
Assuming that L represents the actual harm caused by an accident and that 
L will always be paid in the event of a spill, a liability scheme based on 
charging the shipper $1 million each time an accident occurs will efficiently 
manage risks.  This scheme aligns private and social costs.100  Imposing 
liability gives the shipper an incentive to invest roughly $10,000 in precautions 
because doing so minimizes the shipper’s private costs.  This level is also 
socially optimal because it minimizes the sum of the precautionary costs 
 
 99 The single line in Graph 1 represents both private and social costs, which are equal in this case. 
 100 Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 
628 (1992) (“The optimal deterrence framework holds that liability rules minimize social cost by forcing 
defendants to choose levels of activity and care that reflect social costs and benefits rather than the defendants’ 
own private costs and benefits.”). 
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expended by the shipper (which are themselves a cost to society) and the social 
costs generated by the risk. 
However, the well-functioning liability scheme described above goes awry 
if the shipper is sometimes able to escape paying damages when accidents 
occur.101  Perhaps spills are difficult to detect, or perhaps the harms from spills 
only manifest long after an accident occurs.102  Assume that the probability that 
the shipper will have to pay $1 million for a given accident is 0.25.  The 
following table shows how this causes private and social costs to diverge: 
  
 
 101 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 887–89. 
 102 See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Ex-Grace Officials on Trial in Asbestos Poisoning, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, 
at A15 (“Charlie Welch, 55, who worked as a guard at the mine for a time and says he too suffers from 
asbestosis . . . remembers the trains carrying vermiculite in open rail cars, billowing dust plumes through town 
as they rumbled out to the wider world.”).  The example of shipping asbestos-laden material in open rail cars 
proves that tortious conduct may be both difficult to detect and slow to manifest.  Id. 
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Graph & Table 2: Private and Social Costs When the Probability of Paying 
Damages Is 0.25. 
† Indicates the level of precautionary spending that minimizes the shipper’s costs 
* Represents the socially optimal investment in precautions 
Here, ChemShip will choose to invest about $3,000 in precautions because 
this minimizes the shipper’s private costs, but social costs would be 
minimized, as before, if ChemShip were to spend roughly $10,000.  Thus, the 
reduced probability of detection changes the shipper’s cost schedule, causing a 
substantial decrease in social welfare.  When, as in the previous example, the 
probability of paying damages is 1.0, social costs are $25,202.64, but with the 
decreased probability of detection they are $32,242.07.  Moreover, the 
distributional effect is especially problematic since the shipper is much better 
off in this scenario, with private costs of $10,310.52 rather than the $25,202.64 
he would have to pay under the previous scenario.  Perhaps the most troubling 
implication of this comparison is that ChemShip will have a high incentive to 
conceal accidents or engage in other conduct to escape liability.  When the 
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probability of detection drops from 1.0 to 0.25, ChemShip’s private costs drops 
by nearly 60%.  Accordingly, tortfeasors may attempt to capture the benefits of 
reduced liability by attempting to conceal accidents or by pressuring victims 
not to sue.  This analysis suggests that because of the negative consequences 
associated with reductions in the probability of paying damages, tortfeasors 
who attempt to conceal accidents should be charged additional penalties.103 
3. Punitive Damages & Negligent Torts 
The Hand Formula shows that if an increase in B would result in a decrease 
in P such that the benefit (in terms of a reduction in expected accident costs) 
would exceed the cost of the precaution, then the injurer is negligent.104  
Setting aside other factors (such as proximate cause and pure economic loss), 
the negligent actor will pay L in compensation to the accident victim when B is 
less than P x L.105  In contrast, if the injurer is not negligent, then the injurer is 
not liable—no matter what harm results. 
Since the negligence doctrine completely removes liability when an injurer 
takes “due care,”106 the liability-diminishing effects of a reduction in the 
probability of paying damages may not be large enough to induce a potential 
tortfeasor to spend less than the optimal amount on precautions.  In the present 
example, where liability depends on a showing of negligence, even if the 
probability of detection is as low as 0.25, the shipper will continue to spend the 
socially optimal amount of $10,000, and punitive damages will be 
unnecessary.107  The following graph reveals that the shipper still attains 
minimal private costs (very narrowly) at the socially efficient level of 
precautions: 
 
 103 See Paul H. Rubin, John E. Calfee & Mark F. Grady, BMW v Gore: Mitigating The Punitive 
Economics of Punitive Damages, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 179, 189 (1997). 
 104 POSNER, supra note 80, at 168 (“Hand wrote that a potential injurer is negligent if but only if B < 
PL . . .”).  The “marginal Hand Formula” described by Judge Posner is similar to the formula used in these 
examples.  Id. at 168 n.2 (explaining how the “marginal Hand Formula” is derived). 
 105 See United States. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).  The formulation “If B < 
PL then the actor is negligent” is in fact an oversimplification.  See infra note for a discussion of a more 
accurate method for assessing negligence based on the “marginal Hand Formula.” 
 106 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 30, at 164, § 31, at 169 (W. Page Keeton 
ed., 5th ed. 1984). 
 107 The model presented in this Part reveals that this may often be the case. 
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Graph & Table 3: Private and Social Costs in Negligence When the Probability 
of Paying Damages Is 0.25 
* Represents the socially optimal investment in precautions 
The “carrot” of zero liability in a negligence regime provides a sufficient 
incentive for ChemShip to exercise due care.  In this case, even the cost-
distorting effects of reductions in the probability of detection do not 
necessarily lead to inefficient outcomes.  True, when the probability of 
detection is 0.25, only one in four of those injured by negligent tortfeasors will 
be compensated, but punitive damages will not solve that problem.  Instead, 
 
 108 The shipper is non-negligent and therefore has expected liability of zero dollars once approximately 
$10,000 has been spent on precautions.  This is so because according to the marginal conception of negligence 
(which is more accurate than a non-marginal approach), the optimal level of precaution occurs at the point 
where taking any further precautions would not pass a cost-benefit test.  Spending an additional dollar on 






















B + (P x L) 
Total Private 
Cost 
B + (P x L) x 
0.25 If negligent 
  $0.00 0.0510 $1,000,000.00 $51,000.00 $12,750.00   $51,000.00   $12,750.00 
  $3,000.00 0.0296 $1,000,000.00 $29,571.43 $7,392.86   $32,571.43   $10,392.86 
*$10,000.00 0.0153 $1,000,000.00 $15,285.71 $0.00 *$25,285.71 *$10,000.00 
$20,000.00 0.0093 $1,000,000.00 $9,333.33 $0.00   $29,333.33   $20,000.00 
$30,000.00 0.0069 $1,000,000.00 $6,882.35 $0.00   $36,882.35   $30,000.00 
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policies should be directed toward increasing the probability of detection so 
that all parties injured by negligence may be compensated.  This may be 
accomplished by providing additional punishment for tortfeasors who take 
measures to decrease the probability of detection of their actions, in effect 
reducing potential tortfeasors’ incentive to conceal harms.109  Such tortfeasors 
would obviously include those who attempt to conceal harms, but should also 
include tortfeasors who conduct their operations in such a way that tracing 
harms is difficult. 
However, reducing the probability of paying damages from 0.25 to 0.1 
dramatically alters the shipper’s incentives and demonstrates that a negligence 
regime will not always cause the shipper to take due care.  When the 
probability of detection drops to 0.1, the model predicts that the shipper will 
take few or no precautions. 
  
 
 109 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 623 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The most 
straightforward rationale for punitive damages, as for fines and other criminal punishments that exceed the 
actual injury done by (or profit obtained by) the tortfeasor or criminal, is that they are necessary to deter torts 
or crimes that are concealable.”). 
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Graph & Table 4: Private and Social Costs in a Negligence Regime When the 
Probability of Paying Damages Is 0.1 
 
† Indicates the level of precautionary spending that minimizes the shipper’s costs 
* Represents the socially optimal investment in precautions 
The result is a serious misalignment between the level of care that is 
optimal for the shipper and the level optimal for society.  Here, punitive 
damages must be assessed to restore the alignment between social and private 
costs.  The conclusion, therefore, is not that punitive damages are always or 
never appropriate in negligence regimes, but that they must be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis to determine whether circumstances or misconduct have 
made it more profitable for the tortfeasor to spend less than the socially 
optimal amount on precautions.110  Fortunately, when a divergence of 
 
 110 This determination could require some rather complex calculations, but this Comment maintains that 
only a case-by-case method for assessing punitive damages in negligence cases will achieve efficient results. 
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optimums111 occurs—whether in strict liability or in negligence—the 
alignment of costs can be restored by multiplying the damages payment by the 
reciprocal of the probability of detection, thus charging the tortfeasor 
“punitive” damages each time the tortfeasor is caught.112  Multiplying the 
damages in Table 2 by four would undo the effects of the 0.25 probability of 
not paying damages, essentially recreating the scheme in Table 1.  If punitive 
damages were calculated in this manner, the shipper would once again spend 
the optimal amount on precautions.  Even after this correction, a distributional 
problem remains because the shipper will pay four times as much to a quarter 
as many plaintiffs, while three-quarters of the victims receive nothing.  But 
interestingly, the distributional inequalities among the injured may lead to an 
increase in the probability of detection: publicity from lawsuits with high 
damages, combined with communication among plaintiffs and others who have 
been injured, will perhaps give the remaining three quarters of potential 
plaintiffs sufficient information and incentive to sue.113  When it becomes 
apparent that the probability of detection has increased, punitive damages 
should be lowered to avoid over-deterrence and unnecessarily large penalties. 
4. Punitive Damages for Reckless Conduct 
Economically speaking, conduct is “reckless” when a tortfeasor refuses to 
take basic precautions despite very high expected accident costs.114  In terms of 
the familiar variables, B is relatively low while P x L is high.115  Suppose that 
in the ChemShip scenario described above, the probability of an accident 
occurring could be reduced tenfold with an expenditure of only $5,000, but 
 
 111 For example, a divergence of optimums occurs when social and private costs vary in such a way that 
the potential injurer is better off taking a socially inefficient level of precaution. 
 112 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 874.  Interestingly, in some cases a punitive award along these 
lines will be justified even if the tortfeasor’s conduct implies no culpability.  In such situations, there is a 
genuine disconnect between the rationales of retribution and deterrence.  See infra Part III.C. 
 113 Cf. Barbara Pressley Noble, At Work; The Legacy of Jack McGann, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1992, § 3, at 
27 (reporting that a single case filed against an employer for discriminatory termination of insurance benefits 
helped turn the issue into a cause célèbre). 
 114 FRIEDMAN, supra note 80, at 208 (“Part of what makes us describe a tort as reckless is the failure of 
the tortfeasor to take even the simplest and most obvious precautions.”); POSNER, supra note 80, at 207.  Non-
economic formulations of recklessness are less precise.  See KEETON ET AL., supra note 106, § 34, at 214 
(“[T]here is often no clear distinction at all between such [willful, wanton, or reckless] conduct and ‘gross’ 
negligence, and the two have tended to merge and take on the same meaning, of an aggravated form of 
negligence, differing in quality rather than in degree from ordinary lack of care.”). 
 115 POSNER, supra note 80, at 207–09 (“B is positive but extremely low, while P and L are both extremely 
high.”).  Judge Posner’s assertion that both P and L are extremely high does not make much sense.  Even in his 
example, it seems unlikely that P would be “extremely” high.  It seems more reasonable to judge recklessness 
based on the percentage difference between B and P x L. 
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ChemShip does not make this investment.  Here, the presupposition of 
rationality collapses because it seems clear that the shipper is not minimizing 
its private costs.  Perhaps company managers consider safety precautions to be 
contrary to a “macho” business ethic, or perhaps management is risk-loving.116  
Similarly, profits may be so high that company decision makers do not 
consider $1 million in damages to be worth their attention.117  If, for example, 
the company is earning $1 billion in yearly profits, then as long as managers 
can be sure they will have to pay only $1 million in the case of an accident, 
they may not spend time worrying about such contingencies.  Even with no 
precautions, expected damages would only be $50,000, and assuming punitive 
damages are not awarded, this is indeed a “trifling” sum118 compared to $1 
billion in profits.  Management’s attention is not an unlimited resource,119 and 
if investments of attention in matters other than controlling damages seem 
likely to pay a higher reward, safety may not be prioritized.  Thus, a scarcity of 
managerial attention could explain a company’s failure to take obviously 
efficient precautions. 
Since reckless conduct is by definition inefficient, concerns with over-
deterrence do not come into play.120  Reckless conduct is also easy to avoid, 
since B is low.121  The cognitive errors described above, including the 
irrational attitude towards safety, but especially an extremely profitable firm’s 
 
 116 Craig S. Lerner & Moin A. Yahya, “Left Behind” After Sarbanes-Oxley, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1383, 
1386 (2007) (contrasting “bean counters” with “swashbucklers—that is, people who are risk-neutral with those 
who are possibly risk-loving with respect to business matters and legal compliance”). 
 117 Cf. Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 514 (2002) (“Profitability and growth are frequently the focus of entrants’ attention, 
the very factors that lead many of them to embark on new ventures.  Although entrants will not analyze these 
factors perfectly, given their bounded rationality, entrants will nevertheless focus much attention on them.  
Entrants are likely to ignore other background variables . . . especially if these variables do not affect entrants’ 
ability to embark on a new venture but ‘only’ the venture’s prospects.  The analysis of such variables, if done 
at all, would therefore be more likely to fall prey to the processes of overconfidence, leading entrants to exhibit 
a relative insensitivity to their presence.”). 
 118 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 119 JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING: HOW DECISIONS HAPPEN 10 (1994) (“Time and 
capabilities for attention are limited.  Not everything can be attended to at once.  Too many signals are 
received.  Too many things are relevant to a decision.  Because of these limitations, theories of decision 
making are often better described as theories of attention or search than as theories of choice.  They are 
concerned with the way in which scarce attention is allocated.”). 
 120 FRIEDMAN, supra note 80, at 208 (“Part of what makes us describe a tort as reckless is the failure of 
the tortfeasor to take even the simplest and most obvious precautions.  That suggests that his behavior was 
clearly inefficient, so we need not worry about over deterring it.”). 
 121 POSNER, supra note 80, at 207 (“Take the case of recklessness.  I decide to rest my eyes while driving, 
and plow at high speed into a flock of pedestrians.  B is positive but extremely low, while P and L are both 
extremely high.”). 
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failure to consider inefficiencies that are small in comparison to profits, can be 
overcome by assessing punitive damages.122  The amount of punitive damages 
should be based on contextual factors such as whether the tortfeasor 
demonstrated risk-loving behavior or failed to take precautions because profits 
were so high that harms seemed minimal in comparison.  Punitive damages 
should be calibrated to send a signal to the tortfeasor and to other similarly 
situated actors that will overcome their cognitive biases by showing that 
reckless disregard for safety measures can result in serious financial 
consequences. 
5. Punitive Damages Against Corporations 
Some scholars have suggested that punitive damages should not be 
assessed against corporations123 because (1) punishment of corporate entities 
fails to punish the responsible parties,124 (2) the desire to punish a “legal 
fiction” such as a corporation is incoherent,125 and (3) punitive damages do not 
deter corporations.126  This subsection will explain why each of these claims 
are unpersuasive. 
The first argument states that punitive damages assessed against 
corporations fail to serve a retributive function since the wrong individuals—
stockholders and customers—bear the brunt of the punishment rather than the 
truly responsible parties—managers and directors.127  There are several 
objections to this argument.  First, customers may not be hurt at all because 
firms (especially large corporations able to charge monopoly or quasi-
monopoly prices) may be both willing and able to reduce prices after litigation 
 
 122 See Moin A. Yahya, Deterring Roper’s Juveniles: Using a Law and Economics Approach to Show that 
the Logic of Roper Implies that Juveniles Require the Death Penalty More than Adults, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 
53, 69 (2006) (“Now, suppose that the individual is risk-loving. . . .  [T]here exists a penalty that will deter a 
risk-loving individual, but the penalty required to deter [is] about 70% higher than what [is] needed to deter the 
risk-averse individual.”). 
 123 E.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental 
and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 335 (1998) (arguing that punitive damages fail to incentivize risk-reducing 
behavior in corporations). 
 124 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 949. 
 125 Id. (“We find this conception of the punishment goal unappealing . . . because it necessitates believing 
that people would, after reflecting on the matter, want to impose a penalty on what ultimately is an artificial 
legal construct.  The notion that individuals would want to punish firms per se strikes us as not entirely 
different from the idea that individuals would want to punish inanimate objects for causing harm . . . .”). 
 126 Viscusi, supra note 123, at 288. 
 127 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 949. 
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and attendant bad publicity in order to lure back customers.128  Second, 
stockholders are not completely blameless because they are able to choose 
whose stock to buy, and they have power over the management of the 
corporation.129  Accordingly, stockholders share a portion of the responsibility, 
and a drop in share prices is the deserved consequence of investing in a 
company with a poor safety record.130  Finally, large punitive damages 
assessments against corporations will in fact result in the punishment of 
responsible parties whether the responsible parties are managers or low-level 
employees.  If a manager was responsible for the harm that resulted in punitive 
damages liability, a rational board of directors would fire the manager,131 and, 
similarly, a low-level employee would likely be fired132 and possibly 
imprisoned if the acts were criminal.133 
The second argument against awarding punitive damages for corporate 
misconduct states that the desire to punish a corporation is incoherent since 
corporations are legal constructs and cannot be “responsible” in the same 
manner as natural persons.134  Both legal history and common experience belie 
this argument.  As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., argued in The Common 
Law, long before modern concepts of liability emerged, early legal systems 
sometimes “punished” inanimate objects.135  However, regardless whether 
 
 128 See Bryan Mercurio, Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the Developing World: Problems and 
Barriers of Access to Essential Medicines, 5 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 27 (2006) (“[P]harmaceutical 
companies routinely sell pharmaceuticals at heavily reduced prices to developing countries in order to promote 
goodwill and, in all probability, to counter the negative publicity the industry has received in recent years.”). 
 129 In fact, some have noted that shareholder voting power is on the rise.  See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, 
Shareholder Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on the Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder 
Power, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (“This examination reveals not only that shareholders have become 
more active within recent years, but also that their activism has had an impact on corporate affairs.”). 
 130 Moreover, allowing punitive damages to be imposed against corporations that act reprehensibly could 
encourage ethical investing.  Cf. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 733, 784 (2005) (“An increasing number of investors now put their money in funds committed to 
avoid investments in corporations that create environmental harms . . . .”). 
 131 Cf. Stephanie E. Tanger, Enforcing Corporate Responsibility for Violations of Workplace Immigration 
Laws: The Case of Meatpacking, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 59, 79 (2006) (“In response to the lawsuit, Tyson 
fired the managers who pled guilty and claimed to redouble its efforts . . . .”). 
 132 Often, low-level employees will be judgment-proof.  This in turn provides part of the economic 
justification for the rule of respondeat superior.  See POSNER, supra note 80, at 188 (“[M]ost employees lack 
the resources to pay a judgment . . . .”). 
 133 For instance, Exxon fired Captain Hazelwood soon after the Valdez oil spill, and he also faced criminal 
prosecution.  Exxon Valdez Trial to Be Held in Anchorage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1989, § 1, at 27. 
 134 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 949. 
 135 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 8–38 (Dover 1991) (1881).  As Justice Holmes 
explained: 
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ancient law saw fit to punish inanimate objects, a corporation is, in fact, much 
closer to a human being than to an axe or a stone.136  Thus, a fortiori, 
punishing a corporate entity—with its ability to buy and sell, to produce goods, 
to own property, to “remember” through institutional memory, and to “think” 
through its managers—is far from incoherent.  Punishment alters corporate 
behavior, just as it does the conduct of a natural person.137 
The third argument against assessing punitive damages for corporate 
misconduct states that punitive damages do not induce corporations to reduce 
risks.138  W. Kip Viscusi has used this argument to buttress the claim that 
punitive damages awards should be eliminated against corporations in cases 
involving risk and environmental decisions.139  Using cost–benefit analysis to 
assess the value of punitive damages,140 Viscusi contends that (1) “punitive 
damages have no significant deterrent effect,”141 (2) “eliminating risk becomes 
inordinately costly,”142 (3) “compensatory damages are generally adequate for 
 
We have now followed the development of the chief forms of liability in modern law for 
anything other than the immediate and manifest consequences of a man’s own acts. . . .  We have 
seen a single germ multiplying and branching into products as different from each other as the 
flower from the root.  It hardly remains to ask what that germ was.  We have seen that it was the 
desire of retaliation against the offending thing itself. . . .  A consideration of the earliest 
instances will show, as might have been expected, that vengeance, not compensation, and 
vengeance on the offending thing, was the original object.  The ox in Exodus was to be stoned.  
The axe in the Athenian law was to be banished.  The tree, in Mr. Tylor’s instance, was to be 
chopped to pieces. 
Id. at 34. 
 136 Business law also gives corporations many of the legal rights enjoyed by natural persons.  See Santa 
Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (“The court does not wish to hear argument on the 
question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations.  We are all 
of opinion that it does.” (quoting Chief Justice Waite)) (syllabus).  This adds strength to the argument that 
corporate “persons”—and not only natural persons—should face the possibility of economic punishment 
through punitive damages. 
 137 See Bert Swart, International Trends Towards Establishing Some Form of Punishment for 
Corporations, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 947, 951–52 (2008) (“[C]orporations have their own institutional 
memories.  They can remember things that happened in the past and learn from their experiences.  They can 
correct their policies if they have made mistakes, or if circumstances make it desirable for them to change 
them.  So far as their relationship with the law is concerned, they can make free choices about whether or not 
to comply with the law.  Their freedom of choice in this respect makes it both possible and justifiable to hold 
them accountable for their choices.  Experience also shows that sanctions imposed on corporations for having 
violated the law often induce them to adjust their goals or policies in order to prevent repetition.”). 
 138 Viscusi, supra note 123, at 288. 
 139 Id. at 335. 
 140 Id. at 286–87. 
 141 Id. at 288. 
 142 Id. at 307. 
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deterrence,”143 (4) “market forces promote safety,”144 and (5) “punitive 
damages cause economic harm.”145  On closer examination, Viscusi’s 
arguments are self-contradictory.  The claim that “punitive damages have no 
significant deterrent effect” is incompatible with the claim that “[t]he high 
stakes and high variability of punitive damage awards are of substantial 
concern to companies.”146  When profit-maximizing companies are 
substantially concerned about something that could affect their bottom line, 
they generally take steps to prevent it from happening.147  This is how 
deterrence works to minimize risks in the business context.148  Besides, since 
reckless or intentional conduct is generally a prerequisite for an award of 
punitive damages,149 it is hard to see how, if punitive damages impose a 
“catastrophic threat,”150 punitive damages would not deter reckless—and 
therefore easily avoidable—conduct.  Furthermore, the claim that punitive 
damages will not prompt corporations to be more cautious is especially 
doubtful in light of evidence suggesting that legal liability is perhaps the 
greatest factor inducing corporations to design safer products.151 
A final consideration regarding punitive damages and corporate conduct 
relates to corporate attitudes toward risk.  Some scholars maintain that 
 
 143 Id. at 310. 
 144 Id. at 315. 
 145 Id. at 322. 
 146 See id. at 285.  Viscusi, however, argues that punitive damages are assessed more or less at random, 
making it impossible for a corporation to respond to the threat of punitive damages liability by spending more 
on precautions.  Id. at 309. 
 147 See, e.g., David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CAL. L. REV. 393, 408 
(2008) (describing the “laser focus on the bottom line” that characterizes private business). 
 148 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 554 (2005) (“To 
understand how deterrence works, one must take an ex ante perspective. . . .  As is well known, people can be 
given optimal incentives to take care if they are required to pay damages for any financial losses that they 
cause . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 149 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 106, § 2, at 9–10 (“Something more than the mere commission of a tort 
is always required for punitive damages.  There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage . . . or such a 
conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called willful or wanton.” 
(footnotes omitted)); id. § 35, at 212–13 (explaining that conduct labeled as “willful,” “wanton,” or “reckless” 
remains, “at essence, negligent, rather than actually intended to do harm,” yet “is held to justify an award of 
punitive damages” (footnote omitted)). 
 150 Viscusi, supra note 123, at 285. 
 151 See Sandra F. Gavin, Stealth Tort Reform, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 431, 438 (2008) (“In 1983, the Rand 
Institute studied the ‘serious public policy problem, namely the manufacture of products that may have been 
unreasonably dangerous to their users[,]’ to determine what external pressures had the greatest influence on 
promoting products safety and concluded, ‘[o]f all the various external social pressures, product liability has 
the greatest influence on product design decisions.’” (alteration in original) (quoting GEORGE EADS & PETER 
REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS, CORPORATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND 
REGULATION, at iii–viii (1983))). 
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corporations are “risk-neutral,”152 while most individuals are “risk-averse.”  
Accordingly, damages need not be as high for individuals to ensure the 
appropriate level of deterrence.153  Thus, it may be economically justifiable to 
set damages at a higher level when the defendant is a corporation. 
B. Retributivist Arguments 
The literature on retributivist justifications for punitive damages is 
extensive and provides a refreshing (and perhaps necessary) contrast to the 
economic literature;154 indeed, it seems unlikely that economic theories will 
ever adequately explain punitive damages if such damages are to retain a 
genuinely punitive character.155  Even Judge Posner admits that wealth-
maximizing theories of law and economics are limited as a tool for the 
explanation and generation of legal rules.156  Thus, retributivist modes of 
understanding punitive damages are essential to a complete understanding of 
the role of punitive damages in tort law. 
1. Standing Up to Giants 
In Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, Marc Galanter 
and David Luban provide an eloquent defense of punitive damages without 
relying on economic concepts.157  In their view, punitive damages are “perhaps 
the most important instrument in the legal repertoire for pronouncing moral 
disapproval of economically formidable offenders.”158  All other legal 
sanctions, they argue, fail to carry moral force adequate to address the 
 
 152 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 887 n.44. 
 153 Id. at 886–87. 
 154 See, e.g., Galanter & Luban, supra note 10; Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive 
Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive 
Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003); Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive 
Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105 (2005). 
 155 George P. Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1263, 1264 (1985) (“The criteria 
of crime, criminal responsibility, and punishment have yet to receive an adequate account in the literature of 
law and economics.”). 
 156 POSNER, supra note 80, at 216 (“But the fact that any sort of rape license is even thinkable within the 
framework of the wealth-maximization theory that guides so much of the analysis in this book is a limitation 
on the usefulness of that theory.  What generates the possibility of a rape license is that fact that the rapist’s 
utility is weighted the same as his victim’s utility.  If it were given a zero weight in the calculus of costs and 
benefits, a rape license could not be efficient.  The only persuasive basis for such a weighting, however, would 
be a moral principle different from efficiency.” (emphasis added)).  For other examples of moral atrocities that 
a theory based purely on economic efficiency would recommend, see id. at 11, 12, 27. 
 157 Galanter & Luban, supra note 10. 
 158 Id. at 1428. 
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implications of the underlying conduct.159  Although Galanter and Luban agree 
with economically minded reformers who maintain that punitive damages 
should not be “utterly discretionary and without limits,” their reasoning 
differs.160  In their view, punitive damages should be limited “not because 
completely discretionary punitive damages are economically harmful, as tort 
reformers typically claim, but rather because retribution demands penalties that 
bear a significant relation to the nature of the wrongdoing.”161  In a rebuff to 
the economic logic of punitive damages, Galanter and Luban claim that “[c]ivil 
punishments . . . reinforce the notion of law as a realm of moral achievement 
rather than technical adjustment.”162 
Galanter and Luban are directly on point when they argue that retributive 
concerns, which address the “heinousness of the offense,” are fundamentally 
undermined when punitive awards are keyed to the amount of compensatory 
damages163 because heinous acts may not cause significant compensatory 
damages.164  For instance, “cold-bloodedly throwing a child out of a skyscraper 
window may result in very little harm because the child’s suspenders 
miraculously catch on a flagpole.”165  Because of these concerns, Galanter and 
Luban maintain that retribution and a one-to-one cap are incompatible, and 
they reject proposals to cap punitive damages at a multiple of compensatory 
damages.166  The Court’s endorsement of the retributivist rationale in Exxon 
Shipping thus rings hollow when compared with Galanter and Luban’s 
thoughtful analysis of the moral implications of punitive damages. 
2. The Benefits of “Wild” Awards 
According to Jeffrey White, punitive damages serve a useful social 
function in the law of torts because they allow the community to express its 
moral condemnation of the defendant’s misconduct.167  What is more, judges 
 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 1461. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 1428 (emphasis added). 
 163 Id. at 1432 (“A retributivist scales punishment to the heinousness of the offense, and that is not 
measured by the magnitude of harm.”). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 1461 (“In our view, the limits of punitive damages have to do entirely with the heinousness of 
the wrongful act; they have nothing to do with the size of compensatory awards.  Thus, we oppose proposals to 
cap punitive damages at some small multiple of compensatory damages.”). 
 167 Jeffrey R. White, State Farm and Punitive Damages: Call the Jury Back, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 79, 79 
(2005) (“Nowhere does the civil jury speak louder than when it awards punitive damages against a defendant 
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help to limit the potential economic harm of excessive jury awards.  According 
to David Partlett, “Judges, as repeat players, may exercise the corrective 
function by outlying verdicts in accord with the equity notion that like cases 
should be treated alike.”168  Moreover, “Judges . . . in motions for remitter and 
on appeal, may act as an appropriate corrective.”169 
Similar to White and Galanter and Luban, Partlett also remarks that a jury’s 
assertion of “community outrage about the flouting of a right is not a symptom 
of the illness of the system[,]” because “[e]ven the outrageous punitive award 
establishes a healthy dialogue where the wronged citizen is accorded respect 
and the wrongdoer suffers punishment for his or her misdeeds.”170  In 
conclusion, scholars and judges who ignore the retributivist rationale of 
punitive damages ignore a well-established line of legal tradition that is closely 
tied to common notions of fairness.171 
C. Synthesis 
The foregoing analysis indicates that punitive damages must occasionally 
exceed compensatory damages by a considerable margin.  Exxon Shipping’s 
one-to-one cap unduly fetters punitive damages and will interfere with 
deterrence and retributivist goals.  Accordingly, a one-to-one cap is 
inappropriate if deterrence and retribution are taken as goals of tort law.  
Although tensions exist between deterrence and retribution,172 in most cases 
the two rationales overlap—especially in cases of reckless conduct. 
1. Overlapping Rationales 
Since punitive damages are generally restricted to situations in which the 
tortfeasor has behaved recklessly or intentionally,173 the divide between 
retributivist and economic rationales for punitive damages can easily be 
 
who has violated our common understanding of acceptable behavior.  The jury verdict speaks as the 
conscience of the community.”). 
 168 David F. Partlett, The Republican Model and Punitive Damages, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1409, 1427 
(2004). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Psychology of Punishment, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 171 (2004) 
(“Jurors are intuitive retributivists . . . .”). 
 172 Drumbl, supra note 11, at 577 (“[T]he goals of deterrence . . . may well conflict with those of 
retribution . . . .”). 
 173 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 106, § 2, at 9 (“Something more than the mere commission of a tort is 
always required for punitive damages.”). 
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bridged.  As argued above, one of the least problematic arguments for 
assessing punitive damages applies when the defendant’s conduct is 
reckless.174  Similarly, reckless conduct is blameworthy from a retributivist 
perspective because it suggests that the defendant places a low value on the 
safety of others.175  Thus, proponents of both the retributivist rationale and the 
economic rationale agree that punitive damages should be awarded for reckless 
conduct.  Economic arguments would additionally support an assessment of 
punitive damages for less culpable defendants who are frequently able to 
escape liability.176  In such cases, where less culpable conduct nevertheless 
supports an award of punitive damages, judges could instruct juries that a 
punitive damages award will cause the defendant, and potential defendants, to 
exercise due care and that the award eventually may help other victims to 
receive compensation. 
2. Quantitative Concerns 
In Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, Polinsky and Shavell argue 
that when deterrence and retributivist concerns support differing amounts of 
punitive damages, the best solution is to find a compromise.177  However, 
genuine difficulties exist in calculating the amount of punitive damages when 
retribution is the purpose.  As Galanter and Luban suggest, “The magnitude of 
punishment must reflect the magnitude and, if possible, the nature of the 
asserted inequality between wrongdoer and victim.”178  Clarifying this point, 
they add that “[a] more heinous act expresses more contempt for the victim’s 
value relative to the wrongdoer’s, and so the retributivist believes that a more 
decisive defeat must be visited on the wrongdoer to reassert the public’s 
judgment of the victim’s worth.”179  Unfortunately, Galanter and Luban 
provide little guidance for arriving at the specific dollar amount necessary to 
effect a “decisive defeat.”  However, given that outrageous yet unintentional 
conduct is likely to be at least reckless, even an excessive award by the jury 
does not raise substantial economic concerns—the concept of over-deterrence 
 
 174 See supra Part III.A.3.  
 175 See, e.g., Reeves v. Carlson, 969 P.2d 252, 256 (Kan. 1998) (“To be reckless, conduct must be such as 
to show disregard of or indifference to consequences, under circumstances involving danger to life or safety of 
others.”). 
 176 See supra Part III. 
 177 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 955 (“It is evident that the best level of punitive damages should 
be a compromise between the levels that are optimal when each objective is considered independently.”). 
 178 Galanter & Luban, supra note 10, at 1432. 
 179 Id. at 1433. 
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does not apply to reckless conduct because the optimal level of reckless 
conduct is zero.  Thus, the jury’s reasoned choice of an amount of damages, 
though unguided by numerical rules, will not cause economic harm in cases of 
recklessness. 
IV.  EXXON SHIPPING CO. V. BAKER: A SUSPECT ANALYSIS 
This Part returns to the Court’s decision in Exxon Shipping.  The first 
section summarizes the relevant portions of the majority opinion.  The second 
section critiques the majority opinion and suggests how the Court went wrong 
in crafting its overly restrictive one-to-one rule. 
A. The Majority Opinion 
At trial, the Alaska federal district court certified a mandatory class for the 
more than 32,000 plaintiffs seeking punitive damages against Exxon.180  The 
jury awarded $287 million in compensatory damages to the class of 
commercial fishermen181 and $5 billion in punitive damages.182  On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit remanded the case twice because the punitive damages award did 
not meet the due process standards set by the Supreme Court in its 
constitutional punitive damages cases.183  Ultimately, the circuit court remitted 
the punitive award to $2.5 billion.184 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider several issues, including 
whether the $2.5 billion award was excessive as a matter of maritime common 
law,185 a branch of law “which falls within a federal court’s jurisdiction to 
decide in the manner of a common law court, subject to the authority of 
Congress to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial result.”186  
Although the Court noted that the question of punitive damages in the context 
of maritime law was an issue of first impression,187 the majority opinion 
frequently cited constitutional punitive damages cases, not maritime cases or 
principles.188 
 
 180 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008). 
 181 Id. at 2614. 
 182 Id.  The jury awarded $5,000 in punitive damages against the Valdez’s captain.  Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. at 2611. 
 186 Id. at 2619. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id., passim. 
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In a lengthy survey of punitive damages law,189 the Court emphasized that 
the “real problem” with punitive damage awards is their “stark 
unpredictability.”190  In its review of the Ninth Circuit’s $2.5 billion award, the 
Court specified that its analysis was based on maritime law, and it was 
therefore unnecessary to apply the constitutional doctrines outlined in State 
Farm.191  The Court then reasoned that “the unpredictability of high punitive 
awards . . . is in tension with the function of the awards as  
punitive . . . .”192  According to the majority, an “eccentrically high punitive 
verdict” carries “an implication of unfairness . . . in a system whose commonly 
held notion of law rests on a sense of fairness in dealing with one another.”193 
The Court cited Justice Holmes’s essay, The Path of the Law,194 in support 
of the proposition that “a penalty should be reasonably predictable in its 
severity, so that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can look ahead with some 
ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or 
another.”195  In searching for a rule of law that would reduce or remove 
 
 189 Id. at 2620–25. 
 190 Id. at 2625. 
 191 Id. at 2626.  The Court did not apply the Gore guideposts—reprehensibility, disparity, comparison to 
civil penalties—as required by the due process punitive damages cases.  See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 
517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (setting forth the guideposts). 
 192 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2627. 
 193 Id. 
 194 O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).  Justice Holmes was then 
serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.  Id. at 457. 
 195 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2627.  This argument is not universally accepted.  According to Jeffrey 
R. White: 
Business practices and corporate decisions require cost planning and consideration of potential 
liability exposure.  Unpredictable punitive damage awards are an unwelcome wild card.   
This argument received a cool reception in state courts in the 1980s.  Many took the view 
expressed by the Maine Supreme Court [in Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1359 (Me. 1985),] 
that “the lack of any precise formula by which punitive damages can be calculated is one of the 
important assets of the doctrine.”  As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained [in Fischer v. 
Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 477 (N.J. 1986)]:  
Anticipation of these damages will allow potential defendants, aware of 
dangers of a product, to factor those anticipated damages into a cost-
benefit analysis and to decide whether to market a particular product.  The 
risk and amount of such damages can, and in some cases will, be reflected 
in the cost of a product, in which event the product will be marketed in its 
dangerous condition.   
Thus, [according to Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 218 (Colo. 1984)], ‘[i]f 
punitive damages are predictably certain, they become just another item in the cost of doing 
business.’  That result defeats the purpose of punitive damages in deterring misconduct and turns 
them into a user fee that permits defendants to continue their misconduct for a price. 
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entirely the unpredictability that made punitive damages awards problematic, 
the Court rejected the verbal formulae adopted by various state courts196 and 
remarked that “eliminating unpredictable outlying punitive awards by more 
rigorous standards than the constitutional limit” would likely be best achieved 
in a way analogous to the “criminal-law pattern of quantified limits.”197  The 
Court eventually ruled that “a [one-to-one] ratio, which is above the median 
award, is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases.”198 
B. Critiques 
This section argues that the Court’s reasoning in Exxon Shipping suffers 
from serious flaws.  First, the majority reasoned from a single anecdote (and a 
lack of confirming studies) that punitive damages are unpredictable and thus in 
need of reform.  Second, the majority misread and misused statistics to justify 
capping punitive damages at a one-to-one ratio.  Finally, the majority largely 
ignored deterrence and retributivist rationales for punitive damages. 
1. Drawing an Inference from an Anecdote 
One of the more puzzling aspects of the Court’s opinion is its crafting of a 
new rule to address a situation that even the Court seemed to identify as 
unproblematic.  The Court noted that although punitive damages have “been 
the target of audible criticism in recent decades . . . . [a] survey of the literature 
reveals that discretion to award . . . punitive damages has not mass-produced 
runaway awards . . . .”199  Moreover, “The figures thus show an overall 
restraint . . . .”200  One study cited by the Court201 observed that “[p]unitive 
damages are infrequent, typically for small sums, and concentrated primarily in 
contract-related cases.”202  According to the Court, however, these studies 
obscured the more subtle problem of the unpredictability of punitive 
damages.203 
 
White, supra note 167, at 88 (footnotes omitted). 
 196 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2628–29. 
 197 Id. at 2629. 
 198 Id. at 2629–33. 
 199 Id. at 2624. 
 200 Id. at 2624–25. 
 201 Id. at 2625. 
 202 Brian J. Ostrom, et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79 
JUDICATURE 233, 238 (1996). 
 203 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2625. 
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The Court stated that variability in the size of punitive awards, and in the 
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, could only be acceptable if 
it resulted from judges and juries adopting a measured approach that tended to 
produce both consistent and optimal levels of damages in cases with similar 
facts.204  However, the Court noted that “anecdotal evidence suggests that 
nothing of that sort is going on.”205  This assertion was based on the 
examination of a single anecdote from prior case law: An Alabama jury 
awarded a plaintiff $4 million in punitive damages, while in a different 
Alabama case with “strikingly similar facts,” no punitive damages were 
awarded.206  Remarkably, on the basis of this single anecdote and the Court’s 
further observation that it was not aware of any “scholarly work pointing to 
consistency across punitive awards in cases involving similar claims and 
circumstances,”207 the Court concluded that the unpredictability of punitive 
damages was an established fact.208 
However, the Court’s conclusion that punitive damages are unpredictable 
simply does not follow from these facts.  Even if the ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages varied wildly, this would not prove that punitive 
damages are unpredictable.  Some other factor (or set of factors) could be 
responsible for the variation, and the level of punitive damages could perhaps 
be predicted quite accurately if these other factors were properly understood.  
The Court’s reasoning could be compared to an argument stating that because 
 
 204 Id.  However, the facts in two cases will never be exactly the same.  See George Priest, Introduction to 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 1, 2 (2002) (“The magnitude of punitive 
damages verdicts appears to vary substantially across juries.  But this judgment, too, is problematic.  In some 
sense, no two cases are alike.  Thus, there is an inherent difficulty in evaluating one verdict against 
another . . . .”). 
 205 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2625–26. 
 206 Id. at 2626.  The case involving the $4 million award is BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 
559 (1996), the first case in which the Supreme Court struck down a state court award of punitive damages.  
The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 145, 150 (1996).  Not only is it a 
weak form of argumentation to rely on anecdotal evidence—much less a single anecdote—but the Court 
avoided mentioning that the Alabama Supreme Court remitted the damages to $2 million, and then, after the 
U.S. Supreme Court struck down the award, the Alabama Supreme Court again remitted the award, this time to 
just $50,000.  Thus, the Court exaggerated the true disparity between awards in the two cases.  In addition, 
selecting a case decided before the Court clarified its punitive damages jurisprudence in State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), is misleading.  In Exxon Shipping, the Court 
assessed the supposed inadequacy of the law in 2008, and BMW likely would have been decided differently if 
it had been heard after State Farm.  See W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1405, 1420–26 (2004) (discussing the effect of State Farm on large punitive damages awards). 
 207 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2626. 
 208 Id. at 2625–34. 
KERR GALLEYSFINAL 6/10/2010  2:12 PM 
762 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59 
the height of law students is not correlated with academic performance, then 
student performance in law school is unpredictable. 
Moreover, the Court’s emphasis on predictability is misplaced, since 
punitive damages could be predictable but based on the wrong factors.209  For 
example, if a study were to find that defendants’ wealth is the key determinant 
of punitive damages, then—assuming considerations of a defendant’s wealth 
are unprincipled or against public policy—there would be a serious reason for 
reforming the system even though damages were highly predictable.  
Nevertheless, the Court failed to show that punitive damages actually are 
unpredictable.  A single anecdote is not enough, and since the Court’s one-to-
one rule is supposedly justified by the need to eliminate the unpredictability of 
punitive damages awards, the rule itself is called into question. 
2. The Court’s Misuse of Statistical Evidence 
Commentators have already criticized the Court’s use of statistics in Exxon 
Shipping.210  The following statement shows how the Court misused statistics: 
“[B]y most accounts the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards has 
remained less than [one-to-one] . . . .  The figures . . . suggest that in many 
instances a high ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is substantially 
greater than necessary to punish or deter.”211  This statement exemplifies the 
use of a measure of central tendency (the median ratio of compensatory to 
 
 209 See Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., On the Determinants and Importance of Punitive 
Damage Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 527, 529 (1999) (“An additional concern is not just whether punitive 
damages are predictable, but whether they are predictable for the right reasons.”). 
 210 The Supreme Court has frequently relied on statistical studies.  See Adam Liptak, From One Footnote, 
a Debate over the Tangles of Law, Science and Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, at A16 (“The Supreme 
Court has often considered academic studies in its decisions, starting with Louis D. Brandeis’s famous 1908 
brief collecting medical and other evidence to support laws limiting work hours.  Lawyers still call such 
submissions ‘Brandeis briefs.’  The court’s signal triumph, Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, cited studies 
from psychologists and others, and citations to empirical work are commonplace these days.”).  However, the 
Court’s use of the studies it cited in Exxon Shipping has already drawn heavy criticism: 
“The opinion reads like a bad joke,” said Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, a law professor at Cornell.  
“They say they know of no study showing punitive damages are orderly in any way, and yet they 
cite” a study by Theodore Eisenberg, a prominent empirical legal studies scholar at Cornell, 
“showing punitive damages are pretty orderly.” 
Professor Eisenberg struggled to stay respectful about the [C]ourt’s approach to his 
work . . . .  He finally settled on this phrase: “I believe the [C]ourt went seriously astray” in 
concluding that his work supported a reduced award. 
Id. 
 211 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2624–25 (emphasis added). 
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punitive damages) to indicate what is desirable from an instrumentalist 
perspective.  To see the fallacy of this reasoning, consider that punitive 
damages serve the functions of punishment and deterrence and that for many 
of the reasons described in this Comment (such as a low probability of paying 
damages, recklessness, or morally outrageous disregard for others’ safety), a 
higher ratio is often required. 
The Court embraces this fallacy in holding that punitive damages in cases 
of recklessness should be capped at one-to-one.  The Court’s argument is 
simple: Since most of the time judges and juries award punitive damages such 
that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is less than one-to-one, then 
a one-to-one ratio is a “fair upper limit.”212  As stated before, this is an illogical 
argument.  The Court’s justification for capping the ratio at one-to-one is 
formally equivalent to an argument that since the average criminal goes to jail 
for fifty months,213 then no criminal shall serve a longer sentence.  In 
conclusion, the Court’s assertion that punitive damages are unpredictable is 
unwarranted based on the data the Court examined.  Moreover, the Court 
compounds the error by creating a rule in which a ratio based on the median is 
applied in a sweeping manner to all cases of reckless conduct. 
3. The Court’s Failure to Consider Either Deterrence or Retribution 
In Exxon Shipping, the Court failed to consider the consequences of its one-
to-one cap.  As the economic analysis of punitive damages in Part III of this 
Comment reveals, total damages often must be increased by adding punitive 
damages when the probability is less than 1.0 that the defendant will pay 
compensatory damages.  Regrettably, the Court’s one-to-one rule will only 
provide adequate deterrence when the chance of paying damages is fifty 
percent or greater.214  Worse, a one-to-one cap will diminish the ability of 
punitive damages to minimize reckless conduct.215  In sum, the Court in Exxon 
 
 212 Id. at 2633. 
 213 Sentencing-Guideline Study Finds Continuing Disparities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2004, at A11 
(describing study by U.S. Sentencing Commission finding that the average federal prison inmate’s sentence is 
fifty months). 
 214 A one-to-one cap will only allow total damages to be twice the amount of compensatory damages.  As 
explained in Part III, when the probability of the defendant paying damages is only 0.5, then (assuming the 
reward for negligence does not already provide the defendant an adequate incentive to take efficient 
precautions) compensatory damages must be multiplied by two.  If the odds of paying damages were any less 
than 0.5, then a one-to-one cap would prevent the tort system from charging the defendant enough to ensure 
that private and social costs do not continue to diverge. 
 215 The one-to-one cap will be especially harmful when compensatory damages are low or when the 
defendant’s taste for risk warrants significantly higher damages.  See supra Part III. 
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Shipping almost completely ignored the economic and deterrence-based 
rationales for punitive damages. 
Additionally, the Court refused to acknowledge the strong retributive 
concerns present in the case.  The opinion ignores the well-documented 
devastation of the Alaskan environment and the oil spill’s damaging effects on 
the lives and livelihoods of those Alaskans and Native Americans living 
nearby.  Given that the Court has endorsed retribution as a justification for 
punitive damages,216 it is puzzling that it would fail to mention facts that show 
the blameworthiness of the defendant.217  Moreover, since the district court 
created a mandatory punitive damages class, it is difficult to see why Exxon’s 
punishment-worthy conduct should have been so narrowly circumscribed.218  
Even if there was a procedural bar to considering certain elements of Exxon’s 
conduct for purposes of increasing or maintaining the punitive damages award, 
the company’s reckless acts still warranted more detailed description in the 
opinion.  An examination of facts the Court failed to mention reveals a much 
more shocking picture of the human and environmental costs of the spill,219 as 
well as Exxon’s obstructionist legal strategy,220 and the deceitfulness of the 
company toward those who were harmed.221  On the other hand, the Court 
 
 216 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2621 (“[T]he consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at 
compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”). 
 217 Some felt that the Court hardly acknowledged Exxon’s blameworthiness.  See Adam Liptak, Damages 
Cut Against Exxon in Valdez Case, N.Y TIMES, June 26, 2008, at A1 (“Jeffrey L. Fisher, a lawyer for the 
plaintiffs, said there was ‘a great deal of sadness’ among his clients.  ‘What is painful,’ Mr. Fisher said, ‘is that 
there seems to have been some disagreement between the dissenters and the majority on how reprehensible 
Exxon’s conduct was.’”).  Some scholars have argued that the Court was already ignoring the retributivist 
rationale for punitive damages before Exxon Shipping was decided.  See Paul J. Zwier, The Utility of a 
Nonconsequentialist Rationale for Civil Jury-Awarded Punitive Damages, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 403, 404 (2006) 
(describing “the harm the Court inflicts by minimizing the retributive justification and usurping the discretion 
of the jury” and arguing that “the Court backhandedly endorsed the law and economics, or deterrence, model 
of punishment and ignored the broader effects on social norms and values that result from taking the 
retribution analysis out of the hands of a common law jury”). 
 218 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2613. 
 219 See supra Part I. 
 220 See Denise E. Antolini, Punitive Damages in Rhetoric and Reality: An Integrated Empirical Analysis 
of Punitive Damages Judgments in Hawaii, 1985–2001, 20 J.L. & POL. 143, 148 (2004) (“[C]onsumer 
advocate Ralph Nader decried Exxon’s failure to pay the award more than a decade after the verdict, calling 
the company’s response to the award ‘a legal war of attrition, while thousands of Alaskans and others 
suffered.’” (quoting Ralph Nader, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied, COMMONDREAMS.ORG, Oct. 9, 2000, 
http://www.commondreams.org/views/101000-109.htm)). 
 221 See, e.g., OTT, supra note 14, at 23 (reporting that in the effort to get the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System 
permit, “Exxon’s Ken Fountain told lobbyists, ‘I don’t care if every goddamn fish dies, get that [authorization] 
permit . . . .’”).  Some of Exxon’s methods for cleaning up the spill oil were harmful to the environment and to 
the health of cleanup workers, and an Exxon official admitted that the actual cleanup was secondary to “its 
public image aspects.”  Id. at 52 (describing how the high-pressure “hot-water wash” used to clean the 
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notes that Exxon spent billions on voluntary cleanup efforts222 (though some 
commentators have described these efforts as counterproductive, unsafe, and 
predominately motivated by public relations concerns).223  If evidence of the 
resources spent on cleanup was admissible to mitigate the award, it is hard to 
see why other post-spill facts relating to Exxon’s blameworthiness for 
damaging the environment were not admissible to at least maintain the jury’s 
punitive damages award. 
Pre-spill facts are particularly relevant to assessing the reprehensibility of 
Exxon’s conduct.  For example, oil companies, including Exxon, promised 
Alaskans that tankers operating in Prince William Sound would have double-
bottomed hulls, but broke this promise almost as soon as they received their 
operating permits.224  Reinforced hulls could have reduced the volume of the 
spill by as much as sixty percent.225  Exxon representatives promised victims 
of the spill that if “you show that your motel goes out of business, that we can 
take care of. . . .  If you can show that you have a loss as a result of this spill, 
we will compensate it,”226 but then fought to have all the claims dismissed and 
delayed paying the judgment for nearly twenty years.227 
Those who vested their hopes in the payment of the jury’s original verdict 
must have endured torments similar to those of poor Carstone in Dickens’s 
Bleak House.228  In 2007, Exxon (now ExxonMobil) earned $40.6 billion in 
 
shoreline “cooked clams, mussels, and other intertidal animals that had survived the spill and destroyed sea 
plants and animals that supported the entire coastal ecosystem”). 
 222 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2613 (“In the aftermath of the disaster, Exxon spent around $2.1 billion 
in cleanup efforts.”). 
 223 Some consider Exxon’s cleanup efforts to have been ineffective and mishandled, and claim the 
cleanup imposed serious health risks on the cleanup workers.  OTT, supra note 14, at 52.  Some critics think 
that Exxon’s expenditure of $2 billion on cleanup may have been more harmful to Prince William Sound than 
doing nothing.  SCHOCH, supra note 29, at 44–45.  If so, it is a valid question whether the cleanup should have 
been considered as a mitigating factor at all. 
 224 OTT, supra note 14, at 186–87. 
 225 Keith E. Sealing, Civil Procedure in Substantive Context: The Exxon-Valdez Cases, 47 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 63, 68 n.29 (2003). 
 226 OTT, supra note 14, at 47 (alteration in original). 
 227 Id. at 113. 
 228 See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 936 (Nicola Bradbury ed., Penguin Books 1996) (1853) 
(“Richard [Carstone], more worn and haggard, haunted the court day after day, listlessly sat there the whole 
day long when he knew there was no remote chance of the suit being mentioned, and became one of the stock 
sights of the place.  I wonder whether any of the gentlemen remembered him as he was when he first went 
there.”); OTT, supra note 14, at 272 (“Closure for individuals is a different story.  Those who lean heavily on 
the Supreme Court’s decision may close this chapter of their lives soon after the court makes a ruling.  Those 
who wait for the herring to rebound may be waiting years or decades.  Those who died—over 6,000—while 
their cases churned through the judiciary system will never have had the peace of closure.”). 
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profits, breaking its own previous record and once again establishing itself as 
the most profitable corporation in history.229  In light of this fact, and 
considering the Supreme Court’s reduction of the company’s liability for 
punitive damages to roughly one-tenth of the jury’s original $5 billion verdict, 
it is not difficult to understand what lies behind the popular impression that the 
Court promotes the interests of corporations over individuals.230  In conclusion, 
the Court thoroughly undermined its own statement that retribution is a 
justification for punitive damages both by its choice of a one-to-one cap and its 
treatment of the facts in Exxon Shipping. 
V. AN OUTLIER CASE 
The Court in Exxon Shipping emphasized that the one-to-one ratio applies 
only in maritime cases.231  For punitive damages litigation outside maritime 
law, the extent to which Exxon Shipping will prove influential remains an open 
question.232  Several courts have already cited the case as persuasive precedent 
for limiting punitive damages more than the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
punitive damages cases require.233  Since, as this Comment argues, the rule of 
Exxon Shipping excessively limits punitive damages, it will be important to 
distinguish it in non-maritime punitive damages cases. 
Historically, limitations of liability has been an important principle of 
maritime law.234  These limits are justified by the inherent risks of shipping, 
the need to promote maritime commerce, and the unfairness of holding 
shipowners liable for circumstances outside their control.235  According to 
Thomas Schoenbaum’s treatise, Admiralty and Maritime Law, “the principle of 
limitation of liability remains vital to those involved in the shipping industry 
 
 229 Jad Mouawad, Exxon Sets Profit Record: $40.6 Billion Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at C3. 
 230 See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, (Magazine) at MM38 (discussing 
the pro-business trend in Supreme Court decisions). 
 231 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2631–32 (2008). 
 232 As the Court made clear in Exxon Shipping, the case is not binding outside of admiralty.  Id. at  
2626–27. 
 233 See, e.g., Leavey v. Unum Provident Corp., 295 F. App’x 255, 259 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (“While the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker . . . review[ed] a jury award for conformity 
with maritime law, rather than the outer limit allowed by due process, . . . the Court’s statements in that case 
support the district court’s decision to reduce the award here.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 429, 484 n.46 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (“Although Exxon is 
a maritime law case, it is clear that the Supreme Court intends that its holding have a much broader 
application.”). 
 234 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY & MARITIME LAW § 15-1 (4th ed. 2009). 
 235 Id. 
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and even to those who seek its services.”236  The Limitation of Shipowners’ 
Liability Act, enacted by Congress in 1851, remains the binding legal source of 
the limited liability principle in U.S. maritime law.237  In British Transport 
Commission v. United States, the Supreme Court described the Act as intended 
to limit shipowners’ liability to the value of their ships and thus to encourage 
maritime commerce and shipbuilding.238  Clearly, maritime law limited 
liability long before Exxon Shipping. 
Furthermore, before Exxon Shipping, the Court’s decision in Miles v. Apex 
Marine239 had the practical effect of limiting punitive damages in maritime 
cases.240  Thus, maritime law historically imposed special limits on both 
punitive damages and general liability that do not apply to non-maritime.241  
While Exxon Shipping makes no explicit reference to the liability-limiting 
principles of maritime law (or to the punitive damages implications of Miles), 
the history of maritime law reveals that applying the holding of a liability-
limiting case like Exxon Shipping is simply inappropriate in the context of non-
maritime law.  In sum, Exxon Shipping is a maritime case, and its holding 
should be strictly confined within the limits of maritime jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court laid out its constitutional punitive damages 
jurisprudence in BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore242 and State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.243  These cases addressed 
genuine concerns with the punitive damages system and provided reasonable 
guidelines for courts to follow when reviewing punitive damages awards.244  
The Court’s most recent decision in Exxon Shipping breaks with these earlier 
cases in two significant ways: it is not well-reasoned, and the rule it establishes 
 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 354 U.S. 129, 133 (1957). 
 239 498 U.S. 19 (1990). 
 240 John W. DeGravelles, Uncertain Seas for Maritime Punitive Damages, TRIAL, Jan. 2004, at 50, 51 
(“Although Miles did not address punitive damages specifically, it became the launching pad for much of the 
case law eliminating them from maritime law.”). 
 241 Somewhat tautologically, maritime law principles are based on distinctly maritime concerns.  See 
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 234, § 3-5 (“Thus the test for admiralty tort jurisdiction requires that an incident (1) 
occur on navigable waters; (2) bear a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity; and (3) have a 
potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce.”). 
 242 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 243 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 244 See POSNER, supra note 80, at 207. 
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is inflexible and unsupported by any but the most extreme views of punitive 
damages.  Because it is a maritime case and because punitive damages promote 
fairness and efficiency, Exxon Shipping should neither be cited nor relied upon 
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